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772 RICHARDSON 11. HAll [44 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 23537. In Bank. June 29, 1955.] 
JAMES RICHARDSON et a1., Respondents, v. HERBERT 
( HAM et aI., Appellants. 
BEN W. BARNETT et aI., Respondents, v. HERBERT HAM 
et aI., Appellants. 
MARCO J. MEDIN, JR., et aI., Respondents, v. HERBERT 
HAM et at, Appellants. 
[1] New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence-Powers of Trial Oourt. 
-In passing on motion for new trial based on insufficiency of 
evidence, it is exclusive province of trial court to judge credi-
bility of witnesses, detennine probative force of testimony, 
and weigh evidence. 
[2] Id.-Insufilciency of Evidence-Powers of Trial Oourt.-Trial 
court, in considering sufficiency of evidence on motion for new 
trial based on insutliciency of evidence, may draw inferences 
opposed to those drawn at trial, and where only conflicts con-
sist of inferences deduced from uncontradicted probative facts, 
court may resolve such conflicts in determining whether case 
should be retried. 
[3] Id.-Insufficiency of Evidence-Discretion - Review.-Appel-
late court will reverse trial court's order granting motion for 
new trial for insufficiency of evidence only where it can be 
said as matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to 
support contrary judgment. 
[4] Automobiles-Proximate Oause of Injury-Intervening Oauses. 
-Automobiles do not arouse curiosity, and ordinarily the only 
appreciable risk that they will be set in motion if left un-
attended arises from possibility of their being stolen. 
[6] Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In actions against 
owners of bulldozer for in.iuries arising out of its use by youth-
ful vandals at night, evidence is sufficient to ,justify conclusion 
that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that defendants' 
bulldozers might be tampered with when left unattended, and 
thus supports granting of plaintiffs' motions for new trial for 
insufficiency of evidence to sustain verdicts for defendants, 
where such bulldozers aroused curiosity and attracted specta-
[1] See Oal.Jur., New Trial, § 70; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 129 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] New Trial, § 89; [3] New Trial, 
§ 99; [4, 6, 7, 9] Automobiles, § 154; [5] Automobiles, § 362-2; 
[8] Negligence, § 16. 
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tors, curious persons had been known to climb on them, and 
it could reasonably be inferred that they were attractive to 
children when left unattended at end of working day. 
[6] Id. - Proximate Cause of Injury -Intervening Causes.-Ex-
treme danger created by bulldozer in uncontrolled motion and 
foreseeable risk of intermeddling justify imposing duty on 
owner to exercise reasonable care to protect third persons from 
injuries arising from its operation by intermeddlers. 
[7] Id.-Proximate Cause of Injury-Intervening Causes.-There 
is substantial evidence that defendants did not exercise reason-
able care to prevent intermeddlers from setting their bull-
dozer in motion where it is shown that engine could be started 
with bulldozer in gear and, if so started, bulldozer would com-
mence to move immediately, and where, though this risk could 
be avoided by use of simple but effective lock, no such lock 
was used. 
[8] Negligence-Proximate Cause-Intervening Causes.-If realiz-
able likelihood that third person may act in particular manner 
is hazard or one of hazards which makes actor negligent, such 
act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or crim-
inal does not prevent actor from being liable for harm caused 
thereby. 
[9] Automobiles-Proximate Cause of Injury-Intervening Causes. 
-In actions against owners of bulldozer for injuries arising 
out of its use by youthful vandals at night, possibility of in-
tentional, wrongful misconduct that occurred when such 
youths, being unable to stop bulldozer after racing it on top 
of mesa, abandoned it and it ran wild over edge of mesa down 
hill, was not too remote to constitute hazard that would justify 
conclusion that defendants' failure to lock bulldozer was 
negligent, and accordingly defendants' duty to protect plain-
tiffs from injuries caused by uncontrolled and unauthorized 
operation of their bulldozer included duty to protect plaintiffs 
from intentional misconduct of such youths, and such mis-
conduct did not constitute superseding cause of plaintiff's 
harm. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego 
County granting new trials. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Af-
firmed. 
Actions for damages for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of use of bulldozer by third persons. 
Orders granting plaintiffs new trials, affirmed. • 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
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Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer, Ward W. 
Waddell, Jr., and Thomas C. Ackerman, Jr., for Appellants. 
McInnis, Hamilton & Fitzgerald, William T. Fitzgerald, 
• Franklin B. Orfield, Thomas P. Golden and Hubert L. Rose 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants, members of a construction 
contracting partnership, were engaged in earth moving oper-
ations in the development of a new subdivision located on 
top of a mesa in San Diego County. In their work they used 
two 26-ton Allis-Chalmers bulldozers, which were operated 
by two of their employees. The bulldozers did not have elec-
trical ignition systems, and they could be started by pushing 
the compression lever in and stepping on the starter. The 
engine was stopped by pulling the compression lever out. 
They were equipped with fluid drives and could be started 
in gear, in which case they would commence to move as soon 
as the engine started. No locks were supplied with the bull-
dozers by the manufacturer, but the local dealer had im-
provised a lock that would prevent starting. It consisted of 
a metal sleeve welded to a padlock that locked around the 
starter rod thereby preventing the starter from operating. 
The lock provided by the dealer for one of the bulldozers 
was lost, and defendants improvised a substitute. At the close 
of the working day on Saturday, July 5, 1952, the operators 
of the bulldozers parked them near one another on top of 
the mesa. One of them was locked by the dealer's lock, and 
there is evidence that as to the other, only the padlock, but 
not the sleeve of the improvised lock, was put around the 
starter rod. The padlock alone would not prevent the starter 
from operating. The following evening three young men, 
aged 17, 18, and 20, after drinking intoxicants, decided to 
go for a drive with thc wife of one of them. While driving, 
one of them mentioned having seen the bulldozers, and they 
decided to go to the mesa for the purpose of racing them. 
On their arrival, two of the young men left the car and 
attempted to start the bulldozers. They were unable to start 
the bulldozer equipped with the dealer's lock but succeeded 
in starting the other bulldozer. They drove it around the mesa 
for 15 to 30 minutes causing considerable damage, and then, 
being unable to stop it, headed it toward a canyon to the 
east of the mesa and abandoned it. It went off the edge of 
the mesa, down the hill, across a freeway, and traveled for 
.1 
...... 
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about a mile before it was halted by a retaining wall and a 
utility pole. During the course of its journey it traveled 
through a house and seriously in3ured the occupants. It also 
collided with a house-trailer and an automobile causing 
further property damage and personal injuries. Plaintiffs, 
whose persons or property were in the path of the bulldozer, 
brought these actions for damages against defendants alleging 
that they were negligent in leaving the bulldozer unattended 
and unlocked. The actions were consolidated for trial, and 
the jury returned verdicts for defendants. The trial court 
granted motions for a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency 
of the evidence and misconduct of the jury. Defendants 
appeal. 
[1] "In passing upon a motion for a new trial based upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence, it is the exclusive province 
of the trial cOUrt to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
determine the probative force of testimony, and weigh the 
evidence [citations]. [2] In considering the sufficiency of 
the evidence upon such motion the court may draw inferences 
opposed to those drawn at the trial [citation], and where the 
only conflicts consist of inferences deduced from uncontra-
dicted probative facts, the court may resolve such conflicts 
in determining whether the case should be retried [citation]. 
[8] It is only where it can be said as a matter of law that 
there is no substantial evidence to support a contrary judg-
ment that an appellate court will reverse the order of the 
trial court." (Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 00., 27 Ca1.2d 
305, 307 [163 P.2d 689] ; see also Ball.ard v. Pacific Greyhound 
Lines, 28 Ca1.2d 357, 359 [170 P.2d 465] ; Mazzotta v. LoB 
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 25 Ca1.2d 165, 168 [153 P.2d 338] ; Martin 
v. Smith, 103 Cal.App.2d 894, 897-898 [230 P.2d 679], and 
cases cited; 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2062.) 
Defendants contend that there is no substantial evidence 
that would support a judgment against them. They rely 
on the recent decision of this court in Rickards v. Stanley, 
43 Ca.l.2d 60 [271 P.2d 23], holding that, in the absence of 
special circumstances, the duty of an owner of an automobile 
to exercise reasonable care in the management thereof does 
not include a duty to remove the ignition key to protect 
persons on the highway from the negligent driving of a thiif. 
Since, however, the kinds of foreseeable intervening conduct 
by third parties as well as the risks created by such conduct 
in this case are materially different from those considered 
in the Richards case, that case is not controlling here. 
) 
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[4] Automobiles do not arouse curiosity, and ordinarily 
the only appreciable risk that they will be set in motion if 
they are left unattended arises from the possibility of their 
being stolen. [5] The record in the present case, on the other 
"hand, shows that defendants' bulldozers aroused curiosity 
and attracted spectators, while they were in operation as well 
as while they were parked for the night. Moreover, curious 
persons had been known to climb on them, and it could rea-
sonably be inferred that they were attractive to children 
when left unattended at the end of the working day. The 
evidence is therefore sufficient to justify the conclusion that 
there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that defendants' bull-
dozers might be tampered with when left unattended. 
Given this foreseeable risk of intermeddling, the question 
is presented whether defendants were under a duty to exer-
cise reasonable eare to prevent intermeddlers from putting 
their bulldozers in operation. In the Richards case it was 
concluded that even if theft was rpasonably to be foreseen, 
the owner was under no duty to persons on the highway to 
exercise reasonable care to keep his car out of the hands of 
a thief. It was pointed out that the owner will ordinarily 
ha ve no reason to foresee that a thief will be an incompetent 
driver, that the risk of negligent driving arising from pos-
sible theft is less than the risl{ that the owner might inten-
tionally create without negligence by lending his car to 
another, and that it would be anomalous to impose greater 
liability when the car was being driven by a thief than that 
provided by statute when the owner voluntarily entrusts his 
car to another. The risks arising from intermeddling with 
bulldozers, however, are entirely different from those arising 
from the driving of an automobile by a thief. Bulldozers are 
relatively uncommon, and curious children or others attracted 
by them ordinarily will not know how to operate them. An 
intermeddler who starts a bulldozer accidentally or otherwise 
may not be able to stop it, and the potentialities of harm 
from a 26-ton bulldozer in ullcontrollpd motion are enormous, 
parti('ularly when it is left on top of a mesa from which 
it can escape and injun' Pf~rsons nnd property located below. 
[6] The extreme danger created by a bulldozer in uncon-
trolll'u motion and tht' forps(,pahlp risk of intermeddling fully 
justify imposing a duty on the owner to exercise reasonable 
care to protC'et third nartirs from injurip-s nri~ing from its 
operation by intl'rnH'ddlers. (See.J ensen v. Minard, ante, 
pp. 325. a27. :~28 r282 P.2cl 71: Worner v. Santa Catalina 
Island Co., ante, pp. 310, 317 [282 P.2d 12], and cases cited.) 
... 
) 
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[7] In the absence of an effective lock the bulldozer engine 
could be started by pushing in a lever and stepping on the 
starter. Moreover, the engine could be started with the 
bulldozer in gear, and if so started, the bulldozer would 
commence to move immediately. A It.hough this risk could 
be avoided by the use of a simple but effective lock, there is 
evidence that no such lock was used. Accordingly, there is 
substantial evidence that defendants did not exercise reason-
able care to prevent intermeddlers from setting their bull-
dozer in motion. 
It is contended, however, that even if defendants were 
under a duty to protect plaintiffs from injuries from opera-
tion of the bulldozer caused by ordinary intermeddlers, they 
were not under a duty to protect plaintiffs from intprmeddlers 
who deliberately undertook to operate the bulldozer, or, in 
other words, that the intentional misconduct of the young 
men constituted a superseding cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 
(See Rest. Torts, § 448.) [8] It is settled. however. that" If 
the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a 
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which 
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent 
the actor from being liable fo1' harm causf'il thpreby." (Rest. 
Torts, § 449; McEvoy v. American Pool Corp .. 32 Cal.2d 295. 
298-299 [195 P.2d 783] ; Benton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d 399. 405 
r240 P.2d 575].) [9] The possibility of the intentional, 
wrongful misconduct that occurred in this casf' was not so 
remote as not to constitute "one of the hazards" that would 
justify the conclusion that defendants' failure to lock the 
bulldozer was negligent. Accordingly, defendants' duty to 
protect plaintiffs from injuries causeo by the nncontrolJed 
and unauthorized operation of their bulldozer included a duty 
to protect plaintiffs from the intentional misconduct of the 
young men, and such misconduct did not therefore constitute 
a superseding cause of plaintiffs' harm. 
Since the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's 
granting of plaintiffs' motions for a new trial, it is unnecessary 
to decide whether the orders might also hI' sustained on thp. 
ground of the alleged misconduct of the jury. 
The orders are affirmed. 
'. Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the orders 
granting a new trial, as there was alllple evidence to sustain 
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a finding that defendants were negligent, and that such neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage. I also 
agree that this case is distinguishable from Richards v. Stan-
ley,43 Ca1.2d 60 [271 P.2d 23], but I still adhere to the views 
expressed by my dissenting opinion in the Richards case • 
• 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the jUdgment of affirmance, 
but as I read the majority opinion it seeks to establish a 
standard of conduct based upon the view of those members 
of the court joining in said opinion without regard to con-
siderations of public policy and the experience of people 
generally in the ordinary walks of life. It does not appear 
that the Legislature has established a standard of conduct 
for those owning, possessing and operating heavy equipment 
of the character here involved, and such standard must, there-
fore, be determined under the rules of the common law which 
accepts as its criterion the conduct of a reasonably prudent 
person. The determination of this standard, is, of course, in 
the first instance, for the trier of fact; that is, it is for the 
trier of fact to determine from the evidence presented whether 
or not the conduct of the defendants in the instant case was 
that of a reasonably prudent person. If the trier of fact 
determines that such conduct was not that of a reasonably 
prudent person under all the circumstances, the deduction 
to be drawn from such determination is that the defendants 
were negligent. There can be no question but that the de-
fendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs here to exercise ordinary 
care in the control and management of their equipment so 
that it would not inflict injury upon plaintiffs without fault 
on their part. Here, the trial court by granting plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of 
the evidence has determined in the first instance that de-
fendants' conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent 
person and that they violated their duty when they so managed 
and controlled their equipment as to inflict injury upon plain-
tiffs. The District Court of Appeal by unanimous decision 
agreed with this determination of the trial court. (Richardson 
v. Ham Bros. Oonst. 00., ·(Cal.App.) 275 P.2d 532.) This 
determination was based upon the evidence presented to the 
trial court, and that court in the exercise of its fact finding 
power determined that defendants had deviated from the 
standard of conduct of a reasonably prudent person. This is 
the process by which the common law has been developed 
) 
".". 
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and it has never been the function of an appellate court in 
cases of this character to arbitrarily establish standards of 
conduct upon which liability mayor may not be predicated. 
In discussing the development of the common law with 
respect to negligence Mr. Justice Holmes in his work entitled 
The Common Law makes the following illuminating observa-
tion: 
"The cases which have raised difficulties needing explana-
tion are those in which the court has ruled that there was 
prima facie evidence of negligence, or some evidence of neg-
ligence to go to the jury. 
"Many have noticed the confusion of thought implied in 
speaking of such cases as presenting mixed questions of law 
and fact. No doubt, as has been said above, the averment 
that the defendant has been guilty of negligence is a complex 
one: first, that he has done or omitted certain things; second, 
that his alleged conduct does not come up to the legal 
standard. And so long as the controversy is simply on the 
first half, the whole complex averment is plain matter for 
the jury without special instructions, just as a question of 
ownership would be where the only dispute was as to the 
fact upon which the legal conclusion was founded. But when 
a controversy arises on the second half, the question whether 
the court or the jury ought to judge of the defendant's 
conduct is wholly unaffected by the accident, whether there 
is or is not also a dispute as to what that conduct was. If 
there is such a dispute," it is entirely possible to give a series 
of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state of facts 
which it is open to the jury to find. If there is no such dispute, 
the court may still take their opinion as to the standard. 
The problem is to explain the relative functions of court 
and jury with regard to the latter. 
"When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, 
pure and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is 
plain. It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views 
of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule to 
be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed that 
the great body of the law of tort has been derived. But the 
court further feels thAt it is not itself possessed of sufficient 
practical experience to lay down the rule intelligently. " It 
conceives that twelve men taken from the practical part' of 
the community can aid its judgment. Therefore it aids its 
conscience by taking the opinion of the jury." (The Common 
Law, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., pp. 122-123.) 
) 
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As stated above, the standard of conduct applicable to a 
particular factual situation-whether it was that of a reason-
ably prudent persoll-must be derived from daily experience. 
and a jury or trial judge is in a better position than an 
.appellate court to make such determination. It seems clear 
that the only test the courts can apply in determining whether 
the conduct complained of was that of a reasonably prudent 
person is the reasonable minds test. (Johnson v. Southern 
Pac. R. 00., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520] ; Seller v. Market St. 
Ry. 00., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006] ; Herbert v. Southern Pac. 
00., 121 Cal. 227 [53 P. 651] ; Zibbell v. Southern Pac. 00., 
160 Cal. 237 [116 P. 513]; see dissenting opinion, Gray v. 
Brinkerhoff, 41 Ca1.2d 180, 186, 192 [258 P.2d 834].) That 
reasonable minds differ as to whether defendants' conduct 
was that of a reasonably prudent person is demonstrated by 
the record before us which discloses that the trial judge, the 
three members of the District Court of Appeal and a majority 
of this court agree that their conduct was such that negli-
gence may be inferred therefrom. A question of fact is 
therefore presented, and the ruling of the trial court in 
granting a new trial on insufficiency of the evidence must 
be upheld unless settled rules of law are disregarded. 
Just to show that a conflict existed in the evidence, and 
in the inferences to be drawn therefrom, let us look at the 
facts and the inferences which may have motivated the trial 
court in its action in granting plaintiffs a new trial on the 
ground of insufficiency of the evidence: 
The bulldozer in question was parked at the top of a mesa. 
After the intoxicated youths found they were unable to stop 
it, they abandoned italld it went off the edge of the mesa, 
down the hill, across a freeway causing personal injuries and 
property damage on its way. The inference to be drawn from 
the evidence relating to its position was that it was at the 
top of a hill and that the only place for it to go was down. 
The plaintiffs' injuries themselves carry the inference that it 
was left unattended in a place where it could cause injury if 
molested by untrained persons. Herbert Ham, one of the 
defendant owners, testified (by deposition) that he remem-
bered seeing people drive up to look at the bulldozers; that 
he may have seen strangers get on the machines; that he had 
chased people away from the bulldozers mostly when they 
were not running; that all employees had verbal instructions 
to chase onlookers away from the maeh i nes; that he was 
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dozers; that the bulldozers were supposed to be locked with a 
sleeve and padlock which had been improvised to keep the 
machines immobilized. The inferences to be drawn, or which 
may have been drawn by the trial court, from this evidence 
were that defendants were aware that the bulldozers at-
tracted the curious, "mostly" when they were not running; 
that defendants were aware that injury might result if 
strangers got on the machines; that the locks therefor were 
necessary to prevent just such an occurrence as the one here 
involved, and that if any untrained person started the machine 
it would be a danger both to themselves and others. Finney, 
an oiler, whose duty it was to lubricate the machines, testified 
that he had seen people in and about the general area where 
the bulldozers were parked; that these people were watching 
the bulldozers operate; that he had seen people there when he 
left at night; that he did the oiling after the drivers (or cat 
skinners) left for the night; that he was supposed to lock 
the machines when he was through wor]{. A logical inference 
from this is that the defendants knew people were around 
in the vicinity of the parked bulldozers after all employees 
had left and that he was to lock the machines so that they 
would not be meddled with by curious strangers. Schlickel-
man, a cat skinner for defendants testified tbat there was 
no guard on duty to watch the equipment; tbat when be had 
been there at closing time he had seen people from 50 to 100 
feet away watching the bulldozers; that he had seen people 
of all ages watching the machines; that he didn't remember 
whether any had gotten. in the tractor while he had been 
around. It could be reasonably inferred from this that de-
fendants knew that numbers of people of all ages were around 
the area where the bulldozers were parked at closing time. 
Finney, the oiler, testified that to start the machines, a 
lever was pushed and a starter stepped on; that the machine 
could be started in gear and would move right off without 
pressing an accelerator; that it was similar to fluid drive 
except that it would start in gear. It could be inferred from 
this that it would be a simple matter for a curious person 
to start the machine without knowing how to stop it. 
Summing up this evidence together with the inferences 
therefrom, we see an unlocked piece of heavy equipII\ent 
which had a fascination for people of all ages parked un-
attended at the top of a hill with the possibility of causing 
untold damage to human life and property. We also see that 
the defendants knew ourious onlookers were around the park-
) 
) 
782 RICHARDSON t1. HAll [44 C.2d 
ing area at closing time; that orders were given to drive 
these onlookers away; that the machines were supposed to be 
kept locked because of the fear that some of the curious 
might get on the machines and "hurt" somebody. It is 
teasonable to infer that the machine itself, weighing 26 or 7 
tons, would have a fascination which an ordinary automobile 
would not have for the average person. It is also reasonable 
to note that a bulldozer is a machine capable of doing great 
bodily injury as well as property damage if in the hands 
of one not skilled in its operation. From its very size and 
complexity, it is reasonable to infer that once started in a 
downward direction it could not be stopped until it came 
to rest against an object sturdy enough to withstand its 
momentum. It should also be noted that in its downward 
course it would gain momentum and speed and that the force 
with which it would strike anything in its path would be 
greatly increased because of the added momentum and speed. 
This evidence is most certainly sufficient to sustain a ver-
dict for the plaintiffs had one been had; hence it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant plaintiffs 
a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. 
All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent 
others being injured as a result of their acts. Ordinary 
care has been defined as that degree of care which people 
of ordinarily prudent behavior could be reasonably expected 
to exercise under the circumstances of a given case. In 
other words, the care required must be in proportion to the 
danger to be avoided and the consequences that might reason-
ably be anticipated (Orowe v. McBride, 25 Cal.2d 318, 321 
[153 P.2d 727]; Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk 00., 
197 Cal. 82, 98 [239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R. 1027] ; 19 Cal.Jur. 579; 
Warner v. Santa Oatalina Island 00., ante, p. 310 [282 
P.2d 12]). Section 447 of the Restatement of Torts sets forth 
the rule with respect to the intervening act of a third person 
as follows: "The fact that an intervening act of a third 
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner 
does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another 
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent 
conduct should have realized that a third person might so 
act. . •. " This rule is applicable in California (Stasulat v. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. 00., 8 Ca1.2d 631 [67 P.2d 678] ; Mosley 
v. Arden Farms 00., 26 Ca1.2c1 213, 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158 
A.L.R. 872]; Saw1ler v. Southern Calil. Gas Co., 206 Cal. 
-) 
I. 
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866 [274 P. 544]). The evidence here shows without conflict 
that defendants feared intermeddling by unauthorized per-
sons; that they feared the tractors would be started by un-
authorized persons; that they feared harm would come to 
others because of such intermeddling. It seems too clear to 
even warrant comment that the action taken by the intoxi-
cated youths was reasonably foreseeable by defendants and 
hence not a supervening independent cause of plaintiffs' in-
juries and property damage (Gall v. Union Ice 00., IDS Cal. 
App.2d 303, 313 [239 P.2d 4S] ; Northwestern Nat. Ins. 00. 
v. Rogers etc. Foundry, 73 Ca1.App.2d 442 [166 P.2d 401]). 
Zuber v. Olarkson Oonst. 00., 363 Mo. 352 [251 S.W.2d 
52], is a case very similar to the one presently under con-
sideration. Defendant construction company owned large 
motor-driven, earth-moving tractors which it left parked, 
at the end of the day, on a levee with the machinery in gear 
and the switches and ignitions unlocked with fuel in the 
tanks and the breaks off ready to be easily put in operation. 
The plaintiffs alleged that each evening curious spectators 
were gathered around watching the machines; that some of 
these persons had, to the defendant's knowledge, or the knowl-
edge defendant should have had, theretofore started the 
tractors; that the tractors were left unattended at the close 
of the working day. It was alleged further that plaintiffs' 
decedent was killed because of injuries sustained by the 
unauthorized operation of one of defendant's unattended 
tractors. The court there said: "It has been said a person 
who is responsible for an instrumentality which is dangerous 
and likely to cause injury to persons rightfully in its prox-
imity is charged with taking appropriate precautions to 
avoid injury to such persons, and his failure to take such 
precantions constitutes negligence .... It has also been 
stated that a negligent act may be one which creates a situation 
which involves an unreasonable risk to another because of the 
expectable action of a third person. Restatement, Torts, § 302. 
"Relating to those dangers to be reasonably anticipated-
if there is some probability or likelihood, not a mere pos-
sibility, of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary men would 
take precautions to avoid it, then the failure to do so is 
negligence. While the likelihood of a future happening is 
the test of a duty to anticipate, this does not mean the chances 
in favor of the happening must exceed those against it. The 
test is not the balance of probabilities, but of the existence 
of some probability of sufficient moment to induce the rea-
) 
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aonable mind to take the precautions which would avoid it." 
(251 S.W.2d 52, 55.) The court held that the machines, left 
as they were, ready for operation were "potentially danger-
ous, and, if one were started by some reckless person or by 
some intermeddler probably unskilled in the technique of 
its operation, it would (and did) become a monstrous in-
strumentality of destruction. It seems to us it could be 
reasonably said the person, defendant, the owner and re-
sponsible for these machines, with knowledge that curious 
intermeddlers were maldng the practice of operating the 
machines, had reason to anticipate or foresee that other inter-
meddlers would start the machines and that, among those 
who operated the machines, some person, though an adult, 
starting a machine would be reckless or unskilled. I t is not 
too much to say that, in the circumstances averred, a reason-
ably prudent person should take into account these proba-
bilities, and would foresee that some injury was likely to 
ensue." (251 S.W.2d 52, 56.) There are two distinguishing 
features to the Zuber case: it was alleged that defendant 
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
that strangers had intermeddled with the machines and that 
the machines were parked in a public place. Plaintiffs here 
may, on a new trial, be able to produce additional evidence 
and show that defendants lmew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known, that strangers had theretofore 
tampered with the machines or might tamper with them. As 
I have previously pointed out, a logical inference from the 
instructions given to the employees by defendants to lock 
the machines and chase the curious away is that defendants 
had reason to fear the unauthorized actions of third persons. 
Plaintiffs did allege that "said defendant well knew that said 
tractor in its unlocked condition was a dangerous instru-
mentality." The trial judge in his wisdom, in the exercise 
of his discretion, in the performance of his duty granted 
plaintiffs a new trial believing, as he must have believed, 
that the evidence was against the verdict and that plaintiffs 
should have the further opportunity to produce additional 
evidence in support of their allegations. 
In Richards v. Stanley, 43 Ca1.2d 60, 63 [271 P.2d 23], it 
was said in the majority opinion that "In the absence of 
such a statute, however, it has generally been held that the 
owner of an automobile is under no duty to persons who 
may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a 
third person in the absellcc of facts puttillg the owner tm 
MIte. tkal llu tMrd. per8tm ~ incompetent UJ lumdH tI." 
(Emphasis added.) While I do not agree with the last quoted 
statement or with the majority opinion in the Stanley case, 
it needs no citation of authority here to say that defendants 
had knowledge that their machines were destructive forces 
if driven, or meddled with. by persons not specially trained. 
The record shows, without contradiction, that defendants 
knew, and feared, that harm would come to others if the 
machines were meddled with by untrained strangers. Section 
449 of the Restatement of Torts states the rule as follows: 
"If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in 
a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent 
the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby." (Mc-
Evoy v. American Pool Oorp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298-299 [195 
P.2d 783].) 
In order that an appellate court may reverse an order 
of a trial court granting a new trial, it must be found that 
the trial judge in so doing was guilty of a gross, manifest 
and unmistakable abuse of discretion; it must also be found 
that the trial judge violated his duty because it is his duty 
to grant a new trial whenever in his opinion (not that of the 
reviewing court) the evidence on which a decision rests is 
insufficient to justify the decision. Under the facts as pre-
sented by this case, and the law as it stands in this state. how 
can it possibly be said that the trial court abused its discretion' 
